AUGUSTO GATMAYTAN, G. R. No. 132856
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
-
versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS,
DEPUTY
SHERIFF MARVIN I. BELMONTE,
Regional Trial Court, Branch
87, Quezon Promulgated:
City, REGISTER OF DEEDS (of
Calamba),
REGISTER OF DEEDS (of
Mandaluyong,
M.M.), and REGISTER OF DEEDS
(of
Respondents.
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Tinga, J.:
This petition for review assails the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35766, dismissing Augusto
Gatmaytan’s (petitioner) suit for
mandamus to execute, enforce and implement the
orders
dated
Petitioner was hired as counsel for
Preciosa B. Garcia (Preciosa) initially in connection with a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration of the estate of her late husband, Amado
G. Garcia. In a subsequent retainer
agreement[4]
dated
On
Petitioner continuously represented
Preciosa and Agustina in other matters relating to the probate proceedings,
such as, but not limited to, their declaration as sole heirs of Amado Garcia
and the subsequent filing of the project of partition. Eventually, the project of partition[9]
was filed on
9. Taxes, liens, auditor’s and attorney’s fees, as well as all other expenses, shall pertain to and be borne by the estate, Preciosa and Agustina in proportion to their interest in the entire estate, assets and properties subject of this project of partition, and shall be paid before their share or interest is distributed or given to Preciosa and Agustina.[10] [Emphasis supplied.]
On
As
to the attorney’s fees, considering the services rendered by Atty. Augusto G. Gatma[y]tan,
and as this case has been pending for twelve years, the Court fixes the fee of
Atty. Gatma[y]tan at thirty percent (30%) of whatever inheritance may be
received by Preciosa Garcia and Agustina Garcia in this [sic] proceedings. However, as it does not appear that funds are
available for payment of such fees, the payment thereof is deferred until funds
are available.[13]
On P900,711.47.[15] All assets and properties in the conjugal
estate are to be divided, such that one-half (1/2) thereof is awarded to
Preciosa as her conjugal share, and the other half shall pertain to and be
divided between Preciosa and Agustina in equal shares.[16]
On
WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution be issued forthwith. It is understood that the attorney’s fees at
thirty (30%) percent of the inheritance fixed by this court in its order dated
IT IS SO ORDERED.[18]
Pursuant
thereto, on
On P1.2
Billion.[23] Preciosa and Agustina, on the other hand,
opposed petitioner’s motion and instead prayed that the attorney’s fees of 30%
be based on the value as computed and stated in the project of partition duly
approved by the probate court in the Order of 30 April 1990.[24]
On P10,000,000.00)
as attorney’s fees, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the
administratrix and heirs are hereby ordered to pay Atty. Augusto Gatmaytan,
their former counsel in the [a]bove-entitled case and related cases, the amount
of TEN MILLION PESOS (P10,000,000.00) for services rendered in the
settlement of the estate of Amado Garcia, deducting therefrom the amounts paid
as attorney’s fees to said counsel for representing them in Court of Appeals
Cases, C.A.-G.R. Nos. 03221-SP, 65599-R; and in Supreme Court Cases Nos. G.R.
L-4502, 42670 and 63964; and advances received by him for his advocacy to the
instant special proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[26]
The
rationale of the said order was stated in this wise:
None of the two propositions
coming from the counsel-movant on one side, and from the heirs, on the other,
can form a reasonable basis for the court to determine the amount of attorney’s
fees claimed by the counsel-movant. The
latter’s estimate at one billion and two hundred million pesos (P1,200,000,000.00)
would include values of properties other than those contemplated by the court
when it granted 30% of the inheritance.
On the other hand, the heirs[‘] valuation of one-half of the total value
of the property, at P450,355.73 is based on the assessed value of the
estate ten years ago in 1984, when the project of partition was prepared and
submitted to court for the first time.
Furthermore, the heirs propose to merely divide the total value of the
estate into two, without taking into account that not all the properties mentioned
in the project of partition are conjugal.
With these observations, the Court finds counsel’s claim to 30% of [P]1.2
billion of the [sic] property which is three hundred sixty million pesos (P360,000,000.00)
as very unconscionable and that the heirs [sic] figure of P135,106.71,
on the other hand, would make the attorney’s fees unreasonably low for the
settlement of the estate which took the lawyer twenty years to advocate.[27]
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in an Order dated
On
Meanwhile, on 11 November 1994,
petitioner filed a petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals, seeking
the full execution of the writ dated 2 February 1993, particularly the payment
of attorney’s fees of thirty (30%) of the entire estate before distribution.[34]
The petition was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals in a Decision dated P10
million. The appellate court explained:
The writ of execution dated P10,000,000.00) Pesos, less
the deductions therein specified. Be
that as it may, the writ of execution in question cannot be enforced as
insisted by the petitioner considering that the attorney’s fees therein stated
was amended by the order of the court a
quo dated
Hence, the
instant petition seeks the reversal of the dismissal of the petition for
mandamus. It prays for the issuance of
the said writ to compel respondents to enforce, effect and implement the
probate court’s orders dated
At the core of the petition is the
question whether the Court of Appeals acted correctly in denying the petition
for mandamus, a recourse which under the circumstances, is peculiar, to say the
least. We resolve the question in the
affirmative.
In
the instant case, petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel respondents to register and annotate petitioner’s name and interest on
the certificates of title covering the properties and assets of the estate, or
at least enter a memorandum of attorney’s lien on such titles. According to petitioner, it is the
ministerial duty of respondents to enforce, effect and implement the writ of
execution dated
In contrast, respondents argue that
the probate court’s order dated
Mandamus lies to compel the performance
of a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant
or respondent to perform the act required that the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from office, trust or station.[40] Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at
some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done
to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
A writ of
mandamus is proper to compel the issuance of a writ of execution. In such a case, the person to whom the writ
is addressed has no option but to obey the writ. Refusal to obey it is clearly
a violation of the order of, and a manifest disrespect towards, a court of
superior jurisdiction.[41] However,
for a writ of mandamus to be issued, it is essential that petitioner should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of the respondent to perform the act required.[42]
The writ of execution issued on P10 million in its
order of
It is settled that an order of a probate court fixing the amount of fees is regarded as interlocutory in nature, subject to modification or setting aside until the estate proceeding is terminated and the case definitely closed, after which the order becomes final. In other words, an order fixing the fees continues to be under the control of the probate court until the proceeding is closed and until then it may increase or decrease the fees as facts and circumstances develop and unfold which may justify modification of the order even if the fees have already been partially or fully paid, as they may be ordered returned or reimbursed to the estate or a bond required to be filed to guarantee their return or reimbursement.[43]
It is relevant to note that the
probate court’s order of
The appeal to the Court of Appeals
having been completed, it follows that it is that appeal which provides the
appropriate forum, and no other, for questioning the validity or tenability of
the order of
Accordingly, in the mandamus case the
Court of Appeals correctly appreciated that no clear legal right exists to
warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus in favor of petitioner. The writ of execution sought to be enforced
through the petition for mandamus earlier served as the vehicle for the
implementation of the order of
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[8]A
petition for review challenging this decision of the Court of Appeals was
denied by the Supreme Court for lack of merit.
[17] There were other claimants to the estate who interposed appeals to the probate court’s order declaring Preciosa and Agustina as the sole heirs.
[20]In a
letter dated
[40]Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 200, 203 (2000), citing University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 761
(1994); Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272 (1949); Tangonan v. Paño,
137 SCRA 245 (1985); Reparations
Commission v. Morfe, etc., et
al., 120 SCRA 460 (1983); Sagun v. People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation, 162 SCRA 411 (1988).
[41]Lumapas v. Judge Tamin, 389 Phil. 730, 736 (2000), citing Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals, 302
SCRA 331, 343 (1999).
[42]Philippine Coconut Authority v. Primex Coco Products, Inc., G.R. No. 163088, 20 July 2006, citing Pefianco v. Moral, 379 Phil. 468, 479 (2000).